I have watched this one from the fist appearance at the OSH Seaplane base a few years back. It looked to me a lot like the Eclipse "We believe" program that ended up with millions of seed money and hundreds of unfilled orders and an airplane that does not accomplish the low cost mission like what is was intended to do at twice the cost.
The Icon is a great design but that doesn't mean it will be a great manufactured aircraft. Cirrus is constantly used as an example of how to make it but if it were not for the Bank of Bahrain coming in early in the first years of production with huge mezzanine level financing it would have run to zero like the Eclipse did. The toughest part most development programs believe is certification and getting to production. The toughest part is the first two years of production and keeping the cash flow and customer orders filled and not have them vacate. Icon already is showing the first symptom of of this problem and that is they have significantly increased the price for the aircraft.
What happens to companies as they start production is that the cost to manufacture the first say 100 units is markedly higher than the next 100 unit. The problem is the time is also markedly higher (part of the cause of higher cost) to manufacture the first 100 units than the next 100. Also, suppliers are reticent to bet on the come line on a new design. In other words if you need 100 flat screens made, they won't spool their production until you prove you can make it and they likely will be slower than contracted to deliver for the first 100 units.
The next problem is revenue. As noted above cost and time are higher for the first 100 units. The problem is that they are really unknown until the line is running and suppliers are delivering. The manufacturer has set a price based on best knowledge and market forces for the pre-ordered aircraft. Add to this the uncertainty of the ratio of deposit to firm orders and you have a recipe for a cash flow nightmare that is very dependant on cash reserves and second round financing.
Icon just threw a curve ball to their order holders in the above 41 page contract that reads more like a Robinson helicopter program than one from a company like Cirrus. Hard drop dead hourly airframes and unmatched data and hold harmless language are likely to scare away a number of deposit holders. Add to this the price increase and the useful load shrinking and the number of orders to sustain production in the early run is going to be interesting to observe. My guess is the market is much smaller for a 2 place rotax powered wet hulled VFR only aircraft with a price point above $250K than can sustain production of a certified aircraft. "Neat" can fill the shoreline at the Seaplane base but it has a long way to go to make a viable business model.